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Saturday, November 21, 2026

Regulation of Innovation and Innovative Regulation, Revisited

 


Sixteen years on, the dilemma is familiar. The stakes are not.

In April 2010 I opened a post on my blog with a story about horse manure. In 1898, delegates to the world’s first international urban planning conference in New York were consumed not by housing or land use but by the dung produced by the horses that moved the great cities of the world. The story, as it is usually retold, comes with a forecast from London that by 1950 every street would be buried nine feet deep. The forecast never came true. The internal combustion engine arrived, solved the problem, and a century later became a problem of its own.

My argument then was simple. Every great innovation travels the same road, from saviour to Frankenstein, and in financial services that journey had become alarmingly short. Derivatives built to hedge risk became tools to push risk onto unsuspecting investors. Securitisation deepened debt markets and then ended in a situation where nobody really owned the risk of the underlying asset. I concluded that the two principal challenges of the day were the regulation of innovation and innovative regulation.

Sixteen years later I find myself returning to that post, because artificial intelligence is forcing the same question on us. The issues are different, and I will come to how different they are. But the shape of the dilemma is uncannily familiar.

What has not changed

The first thing that has not changed is human nature. In May 2010, writing about the two bullies in my high school who got away with their transgressions because they won trophies for the school, I quoted John Mack of Morgan Stanley on the cause of the 2008 meltdown: greed, leverage and lax standards. Replace leverage with scale and you have a fair description of the AI race. Firms compete to ship new capabilities every few months. Rob Reich, Nate Persily and Anka Reuel have described the frontier laboratories as “tragic accelerators”: they acknowledge the risks, call for safeguards, and keep pushing capabilities forward anyway, under pressure from rivals at home and from China. When Europe debated delaying its AI rules this year, critics warned that the delay could set off a race to market before the rules bite. As I said at the AI-DPI conference in June, market incentives do not naturally reward careful and transparent development.

The second is opacity. Hank Paulson observed that markets became opaque as structured products grew too complex even for sophisticated investors to understand. The difference, and it is an important one, is that a CDO was complex by design; someone could, in principle, take it apart. A neural network with hundreds of billions of parameters is opaque even to the people who built it.

The third is the argument against innovation itself. In 2010 many voices said the answer to the financial crisis was to curtail innovation. I disagreed then, and I disagree now with those who would freeze AI until it is perfectly understood. Claiming we were insulated from the turmoil because our markets were unsophisticated was like saying I never fell because I never rode. The same logic applies to a country of 1.4 billion people that needs AI to deliver health, credit, education and justice at a scale its institutions cannot otherwise reach. Hibernation is not a strategy. But I must also qualify what I said in 2010. My argument that mistakes trigger better controls assumed the mistakes were survivable. A mis-sold financial product can be compensated. Some AI failures cannot be undone, and for those, learning by falling is not an option.

The fourth is that self-regulation is still asking too much. Nothing in the last three years of AI suggests the technology industry has discovered a virtue that finance lacked. Voluntary commitments are useful. They are not a governance system.

What is genuinely different

Now the differences, because they are real, and a regulator who treats AI as just another derivative will fail.

Speed. The printing press, electricity and the internet each took decades to reshape society. AI capabilities shift in months. A rule written around today’s architecture risks being obsolete by the time it is notified.

The object of regulation is unclear. In finance we knew what we were regulating: a product, an institution, a transaction. With AI it is not even settled what the regulated object is. As I argued in my April essay on the DPDP Act, we cannot yet say whether the law should attach to the training dataset, the trained model weights or the outputs. A right to erasure that makes perfect sense for a customer database becomes close to meaningless once the data has been dissolved into billions of parameters.

General purpose. A credit default swap does one thing. A foundation model can draft a contract, read a scan, write malicious code and tutor a child in the same afternoon. Paulson’s complaint in 2010 was that a regulatory structure organised around traditional business lines had not kept up with the markets, leaving duplication in some areas and gaping holes in others. AI makes that problem far worse, because the same model sits underneath every sector at once. And the risks run through the whole stack, from chips, energy and data to the models and the applications built on them.

The knowledge gap has flipped. In 2010 I argued that regulators must attract people with the experience, domain knowledge and attitude to match or better industry strengths. In frontier AI, the expertise, the compute and the data sit overwhelmingly inside a handful of private laboratories. The regulator does not merely lag the industry. In many cases it cannot see what the industry is doing.

Jurisdiction. Technology moves globally; regulation remains stubbornly national. I made this point recently about digital assets and BRICS. It applies with greater force to AI, where a model trained in one country, fine-tuned in a second and distributed through an app store in a third affects citizens in a fourth.

Some of the harm cannot be undone. This is the difference that worries me most. Reich, Persily and Reuel sort AI harms into four families: malicious use and weaponisation; malfunction and loss of control; societal, economic and environmental damage; and harm to individuals and their rights. Finance gave us plenty of the last two. It never gave us the first two. A model that gives someone real help towards a chemical or biological weapon, or an autonomous agent that takes actions nobody intended across thousands of systems at machine speed, is not a mis-sold product that a fine and a refund can fix. The harm may be irreversible, and it may come from a system that was never deployed for a dangerous purpose at all.

Three answers, and the pendulum

Look at how the major jurisdictions have responded and you see the pendulum I wrote about in July 2010, when I described how auditing swung from judgement to rigid rules and was beginning to swing back towards principles.

Europe went first with a comprehensive, rules-heavy law, and is now retreating. Under the Digital Omnibus agreed this year, obligations for stand-alone high-risk systems have moved to 2 December 2027, and those for AI embedded in regulated products to 2 August 2028. The stated reason is that the standards and guidance needed to comply were not ready. The rulebook arrived before the toolkit.

The United States has gone the other way. A December 2025 executive order set up a Justice Department task force to challenge state AI laws, in pursuit of what it calls a minimally burdensome national framework. An earlier attempt to impose a ten-year moratorium on state AI laws was stripped out by the Senate by 99 votes to 1. This is regulation by litigation.

India has chosen a third path. The AI Governance Guidelines released by MeitY in November 2025 are non-binding, rest on seven principles including “innovation over restraint”, and leave binding obligations to existing laws and sector regulators. The RBI’s FREE-AI framework for the financial sector goes a step further and calls for a tolerant supervisory stance towards first-time AI errors by institutions that have put proper safeguards in place.

I have a good deal of sympathy for India’s approach. It also fits a view gaining ground among scholars, that in many respects AI is a normal technology whose impact depends more on how fast it spreads through institutions than on what the frontier model can do. And tolerance for honest first mistakes is what I argued for in 2010. But that tolerance needs a boundary. It is right for a credit model that misprices a loan. It is wrong for a system that could help someone towards a weapon, or that can act on its own across critical infrastructure. On the first kind of risk India’s framework is thoughtful. On the second it says much less, and leans largely on voluntary commitments such as those announced by frontier AI companies at the New Delhi summit in February.

But here is the uncomfortable part. Light touch works only when the hand is strong. A light-touch regime run by a regulator without capacity, data or technical depth is not light touch. It is no touch. The guidelines themselves lean on institutions such as an AI Governance Group and the AI Safety Institute. Whether those bodies get the talent, the budget, the compute and, above all, the courage to act will decide whether the Indian model proves wise or merely permissive. In 2010 I praised SEBI for calling out ULIPs as mutual funds masquerading as insurance. The AI equivalent will be the first time an Indian regulator tells a large and popular AI deployment that it must stop. We have not yet seen that moment.

What innovative regulation looks like for AI

If the challenge in 2010 was innovative regulation, what does that mean for AI? Let me offer seven propositions, drawn from what I saw work while building NSDL and ONDC, and from what I see on the boards of financial institutions grappling with AI today.

First, regulate the function, not the technology. Ask the old questions. Who bears the loss if it fails? Can the decision be challenged? Who is accountable? A loan decision is a loan decision whether a credit officer or a model makes it, and the borrower’s rights should not depend on which.

Second, tier by risk, but admit how hard that is. The obvious approach is to tier by use, with testing, incident reporting and audit for systems that decide on credit, employment, medical treatment, policing or critical infrastructure, and to add a second tier for dangerous capabilities such as weapons uplift or autonomous action at scale. The trouble is that these are not two kinds of system. A bank’s customer-service assistant built on a frontier model carries that model’s full capabilities, whatever the bank intends. The safeguards meant to keep them apart are brittle. Researchers have stripped the safety training from open-weight models in minutes, for less than a dollar of computing time, and a study by CDT and MIT found that even good-faith fine-tuning to improve medical knowledge eroded guardrails in ways that were hard to predict. The line also blurs on purpose: the International AI Safety Report notes that restricting harmful cyber uses can slow the defensive tools that find vulnerabilities first.

Then there is the value chain. High-risk obligations fall on the deployer, the Indian bank or hospital, while knowledge of what the model can do sits with the provider, often abroad, whose terms of use offer few assurances. A deployer cannot certify what it cannot see.

I do not think anyone yet has a clean answer to this, and I would rather say so than pretend. The best available approach is defence in depth: capability testing before release, controls and monitoring at the point of use, incident reporting afterwards, and a duty on model providers to share their test results with those who build on them, with liability shared accordingly. Where those lines should sit ought to be the first assignment for India’s AI Safety Institute, working with RBI, SEBI and the health regulators, rather than something each deployer guesses at alone.

Third, combine rules with principles. My “True and Fair” post argued for a sensible balance of rules and principles, with the weight shifting towards principles. Rules alone will be gamed or will age badly. Principles alone give no certainty. What works is a small number of hard rules on the things that must never happen, and principle-based supervision, backed by board accountability, for everything else.

Fourth, build regulation into the infrastructure. When we built the depository, we did not govern dematerialised shares only by writing a rulebook and sending inspectors; we built the rules into the rails. UPI did the same for payments, the account aggregator framework for consented data sharing, and ONDC for open commerce. AI governance can follow the same techno-legal path: consent artefacts that travel with data, verifiable provenance for content, and logging and audit hooks in public AI platforms. Compliance designed into the architecture is cheaper and far more effective than compliance inspected after the fact.

Fifth, put a review date on every rule. Every AI rule is a bet on how the technology, human behaviour, incentives and institutions will evolve, and some of those bets will be wrong. No AI rule should therefore be permanent by default. We need fixed review cycles, sandboxes with real exit paths, and the willingness to repeal rules that no longer serve their purpose, or to tighten them quickly when a new capability appears. The rules of T20 are not the rules of Test cricket, though both are cricket. The regulator’s job is to watch how the game is changing and modify the rules accordingly.

Sixth, make those who screw up pay up. Tolerance for honest first errors must be matched by real consequences for negligence and repeat failure. Liability is the most efficient regulator ever invented, because it aligns the incentives of the people who understand the system best. Without it, every other measure is advice.

Seventh, do not treat a human click as a safeguard. Many frameworks, ours included, rely on keeping a human in the loop. But requiring a person to approve what an AI agent does assumes that the person can understand the action, catch the error and resist simply approving it. Approval fatigue and the pressure to stay productive turn oversight into rubber-stamping, and a signature that satisfies the rule protects no one. Human oversight has to be designed, staffed and tested, and the human must have both the authority and the time to say no.

The second challenge has changed shape

The other half of my 2010 title, the regulation of innovation, was about something else. I argued that governments must enable and protect disruptive innovations, because incumbents invested in the old system would work overtime to stop them. I gave the example of the oil industry, and recalled the stiff resistance we faced from custodians and registrars when we set up the depository for the Indian capital market.

With AI there is a twist I did not anticipate. The incumbents are now the innovators. The firms at the frontier of AI are among the largest companies the world has seen, and some of them have been among the loudest voices calling for regulation. In 2023 the head of the best-known AI company told the US Senate that a licensing agency might be needed. Licensing can be a genuine safety measure. It can also be the most effective moat ever built, because the cost of compliance falls lightly on a trillion-dollar firm and heavily on a startup in Bengaluru or Jakarta.

So the regulation-of-innovation challenge today cuts both ways. We must protect citizens from the incumbents’ innovations, and we must protect the next generation of innovators from the incumbents’ regulation. I wrote in March that the deeper risk of AI is the concentration of intelligence infrastructure in very few hands. Regulation designed carelessly will accelerate that concentration. Regulation designed well, combined with public digital infrastructure for compute, data and models, can diffuse AI to the edges.

The regulator we need

In 2010 I described the regulator we needed: intellectually capable, courageous enough to take unpopular decisions, morally strong enough not to be swayed by money or influence, and wise enough to get out of the way of genuine game changers. I said such leadership is often available only in limited edition.

The AI age demands one more quality: humility. The regulator must accept that it will often be wrong, and design systems that detect and correct those errors quickly. And it must bring into the room those who bear the costs: the data annotator, the back-office worker, the borrower declined by a model she cannot question. Governance shaped by a few people in a few rooms will serve those few.

The horses did not leave our streets because a regulator banned them. They left because a better technology arrived. Then that technology needed seat belts, traffic lights, emission norms and driving licences, each introduced after the damage became visible, and each late. For everyday uses of AI we can afford some of that lateness, provided we learn quickly and make those who cause harm pay. For the most dangerous capabilities we cannot, because some accidents cannot be counted afterwards. There the seat belts have to be built while the car is still being designed. We will get it far more wrong if we pretend the choice is between innovation and regulation. It never was. The real choice is between clumsy regulation and innovative regulation.

I closed the 2010 post with a line from Arthur C. Clarke. It reads differently now that we have built an intelligence that is not our own.

“It has yet to be proven that intelligence has any survival value.” Arthur C. Clarke


References

From my own writing

1.          T Koshy, “Regulation of Innovation and Innovative Regulation”, Rollingstone Revelations, 25 April 2010

2.          T Koshy, “To be or not to be IV: Challenges of Regulation”, Rollingstone Revelations, 25 May 2010

3.          T Koshy, “Of being True and Fair”, Rollingstone Revelations, 20 July 2010

4.          T Koshy, “Governing the Age of Prediction: Why Digital Public Infrastructure May Define the Future of Freedom”, Rollingstone Revelations, 3 March 2026

5.          T Koshy, “Training Artificial Intelligence Under India’s Data Protection Regime: Navigating the DPDP Act’s Silent Fault Lines”, Rollingstone Revelations, 17 April 2026 (also at tkoshy.me)

6.          T Koshy, “My Speech at the AI-DPI ’26 Conference”, tkoshy.me, June 2026

7.          T Koshy, “For BRICS, the Digital Asset Question Isn’t Which Currency Wins. It’s Who Writes the Rules.”, Rollingstone Revelations, 14 September 2026

Other sources

8.          Rob Reich, Nate Persily and Anka Reuel, “What is AI Governance & Why Is It So Hard?”, AI Gov Lab, 1 October 2026

9.          CMS, “The EU’s Digital Omnibus on AI: What the Provisional Agreement Really Changes”, May 2026

10.      Tech Policy Press, “EU’s AI Act Delays Let High-Risk Systems Dodge Oversight”, April 2026

11.      Ropes & Gray, “Examining the Landscape and Limitations of the Federal Push to Override State AI Regulation”, March 2026

12.      Mintz, note on the December 2025 AI executive order and the Senate’s 99-1 vote

13.      Fortune, “India’s AI Impact Summit closes with the New Delhi Declaration and a $200 billion boost”, 23 February 2026

14.      MeitY, India AI Governance Guidelines, 5 November 2025

15.      Reserve Bank of India, Framework for Responsible and Ethical Enablement of AI (FREE-AI), August 2025

16.      Dmitrii Volkov, “Badllama 3: removing safety finetuning from Llama 3 in minutes”, Palisade Research, July 2024

17.      Center for Democracy & Technology, “New Report Reveals Unexpected Safety Risks from AI Fine-Tuning”

18.      Covington, “International AI Safety Report 2026 Examines AI Capabilities, Risks, and Safeguards”, February 2026

19.      Future of Life Institute, “Can we rely on information sharing?”, October 2023

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