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Tuesday, November 17, 2026

BANKING 2035 | PART 2 OF 2 Building the Foundations

 



Defence, trust and data for India’s AI-era finance, and an agenda for regulators and the ecosystem

Five propositions to argue with

This paper is written to provoke debate among regulators, policymakers, network operators and industry, not to close it. Each proposition is argued in the sections that follow.

•      India’s weakest financial institutions are now one of its biggest systemic risks. In an open, interconnected system, an attacker only needs the least defended door (Section 2).

•      Trust is underpriced until it fails. Markets will not pay for trust they cannot see, so making it visible is a regulatory task before it is a market one (Section 3).

•      India has lost the frontier-model race by orders of magnitude, and should say so plainly. Pretending otherwise misdirects money and talent (Section 4).

•      India’s data is its best AI asset, and its most dangerous one if pooled. The institution that unlocks it must never become the country’s most valuable target (Sections 4 and 5).

•      India’s best export to the Global South will be a method, not a model. Open protocols and governance travel; Indic language models do not (Section 6).

Executive summary

Part 1 of this paper asked who will hold the money and who will hold the customer in 2035. This part asks a prior question: what must India build so that its financial system can be defended, trusted and powered by its own data, whichever scenario arrives? Most of it cannot be built by any single institution.

Defence. AI-assisted attacks reportedly took nearly Rs 300 crore from smaller NBFCs in about two months in 2026, and quantum computing threatens the encryption the system relies on. India has 8,502 registered NBFCs and about 1,457 urban co-operative banks, most without the means to defend themselves alone, and 93% of the institutions surveyed by the RBI rely on third parties for core security functions. Resilience has to be built as a shared capability.

Trust. Customers trust their banks with data more than they trust how fraud is resolved. Markets will not pay for trust they cannot see, so making it visible and machine-readable, for customers and for the AI agents that will act for them, is a task for regulators and standard-setters first.

Data. India is far behind in frontier models, by orders of magnitude in money and with the world’s largest net outflow of AI talent. Its advantage lies in the data generated by public rails and by new sector stacks in agriculture, health, energy and lending. But registries are not yet training data. A federated institution for financial AI could change that, if it is designed so that it does not become the country’s most valuable target.

Talent and the Global South. India’s engineering base and its experience of population-scale systems suit AI use cases for ordinary citizens. Its most valuable export to the Global South is likely to be open methods and governance rather than models.

The agenda. Section 7 sets out seven proposals for regulators, network operators and industry bodies. Section 9 poses questions this paper does not fully answer.

1. The context: four scenarios for 2035

Part 1 identifies three forces reshaping banking: agentic AI, tokenisation under the Finternet vision set out by Agustín Carstens and Nandan Nilekani, and stablecoins. It crosses two uncertainties: whether money stays in regulated bank form or fragments into stablecoins and other tokens, and whether customers keep deciding inside bank channels or delegate to AI agents and open-network apps. That gives the four scenarios in Figure 1.

Title: Scenario frame - Description: Two by two matrix of four 2035 banking scenarios by money layer and customer interface

Figure 1. Scenario frame for 2035, from Part 1: money layer by customer interface.

On current policy, Part 1 judges India most likely to move toward Scenario B, in which public rails and AI agents own the customer interface and banks supply regulated balance sheets. That makes the foundations in this part more pressing in India than elsewhere. An open, agent-driven system is only as strong as its weakest connected institution, only as trusted as its least visible standard, and only as intelligent as the data it can safely use.

2. Defence as a precondition for growth

The threat has already reached the weakest links. In October 2026, The Economic Times reported that AI-assisted cyberattacks had taken nearly Rs 300 crore from smaller NBFCs over about two months, with around 150 complaints and FIRs filed in Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai and other cities. Attackers reportedly spent 10 to 12 days studying each target, broke in through internet-facing applications and exposed APIs, took over credentials for payment gateways and partner banks, and moved funds to mule accounts through IMPS and NEFT. In one Hyderabad case, an NBFC lost more than Rs 3.3 crore through 183 unauthorised transfers in 87 minutes; police were able to block only about Rs 40 lakh.

AI raises the speed of attack; quantum threatens the foundations. The RBI’s June 2026 Financial Stability Report found AI-enabled cyberattacks to be the leading perceived risk among Indian financial institutions for the year ahead, with most rating their own preparedness as developing or intermediate rather than mature. Quantum computing adds a slower but deeper threat. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer would break the public-key encryption that protects payments, authentication and stored data. Because adversaries can copy encrypted data today and decrypt it later, the risk begins before such a machine exists. The G7 Cyber Expert Group’s January 2026 roadmap sets 2035 as the overall target for moving the financial sector to quantum-resistant cryptography, with the most critical systems prioritised for around 2030 to 2032.

India has started, mostly at the top. The National Quantum Mission’s task force published a quantum-safe roadmap in February 2026 that lists financial services among priority sectors. In May 2026 the RBI set up an expert committee on a Quantum Secure and Adaptive Financial Ecosystem, chaired by Professor Anil Prabhakar of IIT Madras with members from SBI, NPCI, DST, MeitY and DSCI, to review the sector’s cryptographic inventory and propose a roadmap. The finance ministry has reportedly asked banks to develop a sector-wide strategy, with an SBI-led working group examining the transition. On fraud, the India Digital Payment Intelligence Corporation, set up in consultation with the RBI to share real-time fraud intelligence, was running in pilot with eight banks in September 2026.

The gap is in the long tail. India has 8,502 registered NBFCs and about 1,457 urban co-operative banks, alongside small finance banks, payments banks and the fintech partners connected to all of them. The RBI’s July 2026 directions on cybersecurity and technology risk now cover all of these entity types, scaled by size and layer, but rules do not create capability. In the RBI’s survey, 93% of institutions relied partly or heavily on third parties for security functions such as monitoring, cloud security and threat intelligence, and 81% spent less than 5% of revenue on IT in 2025-26. That creates two linked risks: weak entry points for attackers, and concentration in a few vendors whose failure would hit many institutions at once. In a system joined by open APIs, UPI and Account Aggregator flows, a breach at a small lender can quickly become a problem for its partner bank and for the rails it uses. As RBI Deputy Governor Shirish Chandra Murmu said in September 2026, quantum resilience is “an ecosystem capability, not an institutional one”.

What follows. Security can no longer be treated as a cost centre that slows growth. In an open, agent-driven system, an institution that cannot show it is secure will increasingly be unable to connect, and will not be chosen. Large banks can largely fund their own defence. For the long tail, the realistic answer is shared capability rather than thousands of separate efforts: sector-level security operations and threat intelligence, a common standard for cryptographic inventories, certified quantum-safe components from vendors, and a minimum security floor for any entity that connects to public rails. Section 7 sets these out.

3. Trust as a standard, not a slogan

Convenience has outrun trust. India’s digital finance was built to remove friction, and it has succeeded. Trust has largely been treated as a given, something the regulator guarantees in the background. Customers notice the gap. In an EY survey of 2,030 Indian banking customers published in May 2026, 82% said they trust their bank with their data, but only 73% believed fraud is resolved effectively.

Markets rarely pay for trust they cannot see. A trust premium is plausible, but it will not appear on its own. Customers cannot judge the security of an app or the conduct of a lender until something goes wrong, so trust tends to be underpriced until a failure and then overpriced in a panic. A premium becomes real only when trust is made visible and verifiable through common standards. India already has early building blocks. The RBI required banks to move to the exclusive bank.in internet domain, registered through IDRBT, by October 2025, with fin.in planned for other financial entities, so that customers can tell a genuine site from a fake. Regulated lenders must report their digital lending apps to the RBI so that borrowers can check whether an app is linked to a regulated entity. The Account Aggregator framework built consent into the architecture rather than the fine print. The DPDP Rules, notified in November 2025, make obligations on consent, security safeguards and breach notification enforceable from May 2027, with penalties of up to Rs 250 crore.

AI agents change the economics of trust. A person rarely reads a security certificate; an AI agent can check every one, every time. If trust signals are standardised and machine-readable, agents acting for customers can route business to institutions that meet them. That is how a trust premium could be earned in practice: through lower acquisition costs, stickier deposits and cheaper funding. The global payment networks are moving in this direction. In September 2026, Visa, Mastercard and Ant International announced work on an interoperable Know Your Agent framework so that AI agents can be identified and verified across networks. The logic runs both ways: institutions must also be able to verify the agents that act on customers’ behalf.

What a financial trust standard could include. Verified identity for domains, apps and agents; clear disclosure of consent and data use; security certification against a published baseline; published service and fraud-resolution metrics; and defined liability when something fails, following the “liability follows control” principle NPCI is weighing for agent payments. Certification would need to be independent, tiered by size and re-tested regularly, so that it signals current practice rather than a one-time audit.

4. India’s data advantage: an institution for financial AI

India is far behind in frontier models. The gap is one of orders of magnitude, not a few years. The IndiaAI Mission has a budget of Rs 10,372 crore over five years, roughly $1.2 billion in total. Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta together plan about $725 billion of capital spending in 2026 alone, most of it on AI: roughly 3,000 times India’s annual public outlay. Private capital does not close the gap; the 2026 Stanford AI Index puts US private AI investment at $285.9 billion in 2025, against $12.4 billion for second-placed China. Talent tells a similar story. India has the world’s second-largest pool of AI researchers, about 50,000, yet recorded the largest net outflow of AI talent of any country in the same report. An earlier MacroPolo study found that 12% of elite AI researchers took their first degree in India, but almost none of them worked there.

The sovereign models are a hedge, not a frontier challenge. The IndiaAI Mission has selected 12 organisations, including Sarvam AI and BharatGen, to build models trained on Indian data and languages, supported by more than 38,000 GPUs offered at subsidised rates. Early results show the distance still to travel: Sarvam’s 2025 model, Sarvam-M, had 24 billion parameters, was built on an open model from France’s Mistral, and drew 23 downloads in its first two days. Later models have improved, but they are optimised for Indian languages and cost rather than for competing with the leading general-purpose systems. They are valuable as insurance and as a base for local adaptation; they should not be mistaken for parity.

The realistic advantage lies in applications and diffusion. Value from AI increasingly comes from applying models to specific, high-quality data, and India’s public rails generate such data at a scale few countries match: more than 25 billion UPI transactions a month, consented financial data through the Account Aggregator network, GST filings, credit bureau records and ONDC commerce flows. For finance, smaller specialised models trained on this data, for credit, fraud and risk, are where India can compete, because the advantage lies in the data rather than in compute.

But an applications strategy depends on someone else’s models. Indian institutions will run largely on closed models from US firms or on open-weight models from the US and China. That creates three risks. Pricing and access are set abroad and could change with licence terms or export controls. Sensitive financial data may have to leave Indian control to be processed. And models tuned to other populations may perform worse on Indian borrowers, which in credit is a question of fairness and accuracy, not only of language. The realistic sovereign goal for finance is therefore control over data, evaluation and deployment, rather than ownership of frontier models.

The data exists but is fragmented. It sits with banks, NBFCs, bureaus, payment apps, tax authorities and networks, under different rules and formats. AIKosh, the national AI data platform, held 7,541 datasets across 20 sectors in February 2026, but its public documentation names no finance datasets. The RBI’s FREE-AI committee recommended shared infrastructure to democratise access to data and compute, and the development of indigenous financial-sector AI models. In October 2026 MeitY published a handbook on the Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture (DEPA) for AI training. It proposes that models travel to the data in secure environments rather than data being pooled, and gives credit models trained on de-identified GST and utility payment data as an example.

The case for an institution. India built UPI through NPCI, a not-for-profit owned by banks, and built Account Aggregator through licensed operators with Sahamati as their self-regulatory body. A comparable institution for financial AI could do three things no single firm can. It could set common standards for how financial data is described, labelled and de-identified. It could run secure environments in which approved models are trained and tested on data that never leaves its custodians. And it could certify the resulting models for fairness and performance before they are used in lending, fraud or risk decisions. The prize is not a single Indian chatbot. It is credit, fraud and risk models trained on Indian behaviour that work for thin-file borrowers and small businesses, and that institutions of every size can use, including those that could never build such models alone. That is how India could lead in the diffusion of AI across finance.

The design risks are real. The DEPA handbook itself acknowledges that removing names does not prevent re-identification, and its proposal to go beyond individual consent for training sits uneasily with India’s consent-led data protection law. A central pool of financial data would also be one of the most valuable targets in the country, which links this issue directly to Section 2. The institution should therefore be federated rather than centralised, consent-respecting by default, governed with representation for citizens as well as industry, and held to the highest security tier from the start.

5. Sector stacks: data foundations for use cases

India is building data rails sector by sector. After identity, payments and financial data, India is now building comparable infrastructure in other sectors. Agri Stack had created more than 10.31 crore farmer IDs by August 2026, linked to land records, and its Digital Crop Survey covered more than 31.3 crore plots in Rabi 2025-26; states keep ownership of their data under a federated design. The Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission had issued more than 93 crore health accounts, with over 104 crore health records linked, by July 2026, and its National Health Claims Exchange aims to standardise insurance claims the way UPI standardised payments. The India Energy Stack, led by REC under the Ministry of Power, reviewed its final report in October 2026 after pilots in six utilities across five states, including peer-to-peer energy trading and energy credentials held in DigiLocker. In lending, the Unified Lending Interface already connects 64 lenders to more than 136 data services.

Language is the layer that makes these usable by everyone. AI4Bharat at IIT Madras, set up as the Nilekani Centre at AI4Bharat in 2022 with Rs 36 crore from Nandan and Rohini Nilekani, and supported with a total of Rs 70 crore from Nandan Nilekani by 2025, builds open-source speech, translation and text models for India’s 22 scheduled languages. Its datasets include 15,000 hours of transcribed speech from more than 400 districts, and its models are used in Bhashini, the national language platform. For a farmer applying for credit or a patient filing a claim, a voice interface in their own language may matter more than any frontier model.

Each stack opens a financial use case. Farmer IDs linked to land records and crop data can support faster, cheaper crop loans and insurance for borrowers that banks have struggled to underwrite. Health records and a common claims exchange can make health insurance cheaper to process and easier to price. Energy credentials and peer-to-peer trading can support lending for rooftop solar and other small renewable assets. Combined with ULI and the Account Aggregator network, these stacks could let a lender assess a farmer, a clinic or a small solar installer from verified data, with consent, rather than from collateral alone.

Registries are not yet training data. Most of these stacks are identity, registry and exchange layers. Their value for AI depends on data quality, how often records are updated, whether consent covers model training, and whether states and departments will share across silos. Linked health records still average little more than one per account, which shows reach rather than depth, and a farmer ID tied to out-of-date land records can mislead a credit model. The institution proposed in Section 4 would need to work across these stacks, not only within finance, with the same federated and consent-respecting design.

6. From India’s engineers to the Global South

India’s advantage is building at population scale and low cost. India has about 1,900 global capability centres employing roughly 2.5 million professionals, the world’s second-largest pool of AI researchers, and the highest AI skill penetration on LinkedIn’s index according to the 2026 Stanford AI Index. It also has a decade of experience building population-scale systems that work on basic phones, in many languages and at near-zero cost per transaction. That combination suits the use cases that matter most to ordinary citizens: credit for first-time borrowers, crop and health insurance, benefit delivery and grievance redress.

But the talent is not yet where the use cases are. The same capability-centre study found a 43% shortfall in AI, data and analytics roles. One industry estimate puts India’s 2026 need at about 1.4 million AI professionals against a pool of about 400,000. Much of India’s engineering capacity serves global enterprises rather than Indian citizens, and India loses more AI talent than any other country. Turning engineers into builders of public-interest use cases needs open data foundations, public procurement that pays for outcomes, and institutions such as AI4Bharat that keep talent working on Indian problems.

The Global South is the natural market. India’s digital public infrastructure is already travelling: in July 2026 the Ministry of External Affairs said 25 countries were piloting components of India’s stack. At the India AI Impact Summit in February 2026, the first in the series held in the Global South, 92 countries and organisations endorsed the New Delhi Declaration, and a Global AI Impact Commons was launched with more than 80 deployment stories from over 30 countries. Countries that share India’s conditions, with many languages, large informal economies and thin credit histories, need affordable, open applications they can adapt and govern themselves.

What India can offer, and what it cannot. India cannot offer the Global South frontier models. It can offer open protocols, reference applications, methods for building language data, and governance models that keep data under national control. For finance, that means open lending and payment rails, credit models that work for thin-file borrowers, and the trust and security standards proposed in Section 7. India’s Indic language models will not transfer directly to other countries, but the open, public-good approach behind them can. The offer competes with Chinese infrastructure packages and with global technology platforms, and it will succeed only if it is cheaper to adopt, easier to govern and proven at home first.

7. An agenda for regulators and the ecosystem

Several of the moves in Part 1’s board agenda cannot be made by individual institutions. They need public or collective action, and most can build on institutions India already has. Table 1 sets out seven proposals for discussion.

Proposal

What it would do

Who could lead

Shared cyber defence for smaller lenders

Security monitoring, threat intelligence and incident response offered as a service to NBFCs, co-operative banks and small finance banks, priced by size

RBI with industry bodies, building on CSIRT-Fin and IDPIC

A quantum-readiness standard for finance

A common cryptographic inventory format, certified quantum-safe components and staged deadlines in line with the G7 2030 to 2035 horizon

RBI quantum committee with DST and CERT-In

A security floor for connecting to public rails

Any entity connecting to UPI, Account Aggregator, ULI or ONDC meets a published, tested baseline and is re-certified regularly

Network operators and their self-regulatory bodies, with the RBI

A financial trust standard

Machine-readable trust signals for institutions, apps and agents; published fraud-resolution metrics; agent identity aligned with global Know Your Agent work

RBI with self-regulatory organisations; IDRBT for identity

Liability rules for agent-initiated transactions

Settle who bears the loss when an AI agent acts wrongly, before agent payments scale

RBI and NPCI

An institution for financial AI data

Federated, DEPA-based secure training environments, common data standards and model certification for finance

RBI and Reserve Bank Innovation Hub with MeitY’s IndiaAI Mission; industry-owned on the NPCI model

Open use cases for the common citizen and the Global South

Open reference applications for credit, insurance and benefits built on Agri Stack, ABDM, the India Energy Stack and ULI, packaged for adoption by partner countries; funding for public-interest AI talent

MeitY’s IndiaAI Mission and the Ministry of External Affairs, with AI4Bharat, network operators and industry

Table 1. Proposals for regulators, network operators and industry bodies.

India’s experience with UPI and Account Aggregator suggests a pattern: public standards and shared infrastructure, with private institutions competing on top. The same pattern can work for defence, trust and data. The risk of not acting collectively is that the gains of AI and the Finternet accrue to the largest banks and platforms, while the losses fall on the long tail of smaller institutions and their customers.

8. Signposts to watch

Table 2 lists signals that would show whether these foundations are being built, or whether the risks are growing faster. Part 1 sets out the market signposts for the scenarios themselves.

Signpost

Points toward

Status, November 2026

RBI’s quantum committee publishes a roadmap with deadlines

Cross-cutting: defence

Committee set up May 2026; report due six months after its first meeting

Further AI-enabled attacks on lenders connected to public rails

Cross-cutting: defence and trust

Nearly Rs 300 crore reported lost by smaller NBFCs in about two months, October 2026

DPDP obligations on consent, security and breach notice become enforceable

Cross-cutting: trust

Main obligations from May 2027

A secure environment for training financial AI on Indian data goes live

Cross-cutting: data; supports B

DEPA for AI training handbook published October 2026

Agri Stack or ABDM data opened, with consent, for credit and insurance underwriting

Cross-cutting: data; supports B

10.31 crore farmer IDs (August 2026); 93 crore health accounts (July 2026)

Table 2. Signposts for defence, trust and data.

9. Questions for discussion

These questions do not have settled answers. They are offered to regulators, policymakers, network operators, industry bodies and civil society to argue over.

•      Should a lender that cannot meet a minimum security standard be allowed to connect to UPI or the Account Aggregator network at all, knowing that excluding it may also cut off credit to its borrowers?

•      Who should pay for shared cyber defence for more than 8,500 NBFCs and 1,400 urban co-operative banks: the institutions, the networks they use, or the state?

•      Can individual consent survive AI training at population scale, or does India need a new form of collective consent? Who speaks for the citizen whose data trains the model?

•      Should India keep funding sovereign foundation models, or redirect more of that money to data, evaluation and applications?

•      Is a national institution for financial AI data a public good or a honeypot? What governance would make you trust it with your own data?

•      What would make a Global South country choose India’s open approach over a Chinese infrastructure package or a global technology platform?

•      If trust becomes machine-readable, will institutions compete on being trustworthy, or on gaming the signals?

10. Limitations and next steps

•      Several figures come from secondary reporting of primary documents (RBI, Sahamati, NPCI, BIS, BCG-FICCI-IBA).

•      Section 2 relies partly on news reporting of recent cyber incidents and policy announcements, some of which are not yet confirmed in official documents.

•      The proposals in Section 7 are outlines; each would need its own design, governance and cost assessment.

•      Sections 5 and 6 go beyond banking. They are included because sector data and engineering talent will shape financial use cases, but they are not examined in depth, and some talent estimates come from commercial reports.

•      Other emerging-market DPI systems, including Indonesia, are treated briefly. The scenario analysis and its supporting evidence are in Part 1.

About the author

T Koshy is the founding Managing Director and CEO of India’s Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), and serves on the Board of Commissioners of the Indonesia Open Network (ION), a Beckn protocol-based digital public infrastructure initiative modelled on ONDC.

He is a Director on the boards of CRIF High Mark, Aditya Birla Housing Finance, Perfios Account Aggregation Services and Last Mile Care.

His career spans NSDL, EY, Projects with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as several national digital transformation programmes in India. He is a distinguished alumnus of IIM Bangalore.

"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable." Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter VIII 

Disclosure: the author’s roles at a credit information company, an Account Aggregator, a housing finance company and an open commerce network relate directly to several proposals in this part, including the security floor for public rails, the trust standard and the financial AI data institution. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of any organisation with which he is associated.

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30.   Outlook Business, Sarvam’s Indic AI model: hype, hope and the hunt for tech sovereignty, May 2025. https://www.outlookbusiness.com/news/sarvams-indic-ai-model-hype-hope-and-the-hunt-for-tech-sovereignty

31.   IIT Madras, IIT Madras launches Nilekani Centre at AI4Bharat, July 2022. https://www.iitm.ac.in/happenings/press-releases-and-coverages/iit-madras-launches-nilekani-centre-ai4bharat-promote

32.   Entrepreneur India, Nandan Nilekani increases support to AI4Bharat with total grant of INR 70 crore, June 2025. https://india.entrepreneur.com/?p=84828

33.   BioVoice News, India creates over 10.31 crore Farmer IDs under AgriStack, August 2026. https://biovoicenews.com/india-10-31-crore-farmer-ids-agristack/

34.   News On AIR, Over 104 crore health records linked to over 93 crore ABHA accounts, July 2026. https://newsonair.gov.in/over-104-crore-health-records-linked-to-over-93-crore-abha-accounts-says-govt/

35.   Telangana Today, National Health Claims Exchange will simplify health insurance claims processing, March 2026. https://telanganatoday.com/national-health-claims-exchange-will-simplify-health-insurance-claims-processing-across-india-says-nha-ceo

36.   T&D India, India Energy Stack taskforce reviews final report, sets out pathway for national rollout, October 2026. https://www.tndindia.com/india-energy-stack-taskforce-reviews-final-report-sets-out-pathway-for-national-rollout/amp/

37.   Storyboard18, India’s 1,900 GCCs face 18 to 43% talent shortfall in key tech roles (Quess Corp), February 2026. https://www.storyboard18.com/how-it-works/indias-1900-gccs-face-18-43-talent-shortfall-in-key-tech-roles-quess-corp-90866.htm

38.   UNI India, AI talent demand gap (BinQle Talent Intelligence Report 2026), October 2026. https://www.uniindia.com/business-economy/ai-talent-demand-gap-india/208921

39.   Open Source For You, MeitY and MEA drive global rollout as 25 nations pilot India’s DPI, July 2026. https://www.opensourceforu.com/2026/07/meity-mea-drive-global-rollout-as-25-nations-pilot-indias-dpi/

40.   Press Information Bureau, India AI Impact Summit 2026 outcomes, 2026. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2238195