Defence, trust and data for India’s AI-era
finance, and an agenda for regulators and the ecosystem
Five propositions to argue
with
This paper is written to provoke
debate among regulators, policymakers, network operators and industry, not to
close it. Each proposition is argued in the sections that follow.
• India’s weakest financial institutions
are now one of its biggest systemic risks. In an open, interconnected system, an attacker only
needs the least defended door (Section 2).
• Trust is underpriced until it fails. Markets will not pay for trust they
cannot see, so making it visible is a regulatory task before it is a market one
(Section 3).
• India has lost the frontier-model race
by orders of magnitude, and should say so plainly. Pretending otherwise misdirects money
and talent (Section 4).
• India’s data is its best AI asset, and
its most dangerous one if pooled. The institution that unlocks it must never become the
country’s most valuable target (Sections 4 and 5).
• India’s best export to the Global
South will be a method, not a model. Open protocols and governance travel; Indic language
models do not (Section 6).
Executive summary
Part 1 of this paper asked who will
hold the money and who will hold the customer in 2035. This part asks a prior
question: what must India build so that its financial system can be defended,
trusted and powered by its own data, whichever scenario arrives? Most of it
cannot be built by any single institution.
Defence. AI-assisted attacks reportedly took
nearly Rs 300 crore from smaller NBFCs in about two months in 2026, and quantum
computing threatens the encryption the system relies on. India has 8,502
registered NBFCs and about 1,457 urban co-operative banks, most without the
means to defend themselves alone, and 93% of the institutions surveyed by the
RBI rely on third parties for core security functions. Resilience has to be
built as a shared capability.
Trust. Customers trust their banks with data
more than they trust how fraud is resolved. Markets will not pay for trust they
cannot see, so making it visible and machine-readable, for customers and for
the AI agents that will act for them, is a task for regulators and
standard-setters first.
Data. India is far behind in frontier
models, by orders of magnitude in money and with the world’s largest net
outflow of AI talent. Its advantage lies in the data generated by public rails
and by new sector stacks in agriculture, health, energy and lending. But
registries are not yet training data. A federated institution for financial AI
could change that, if it is designed so that it does not become the country’s
most valuable target.
Talent and the Global South. India’s engineering base and its
experience of population-scale systems suit AI use cases for ordinary citizens.
Its most valuable export to the Global South is likely to be open methods and
governance rather than models.
The agenda. Section 7 sets out seven proposals
for regulators, network operators and industry bodies. Section 9 poses
questions this paper does not fully answer.
1. The context: four
scenarios for 2035
Part 1 identifies three forces
reshaping banking: agentic AI, tokenisation under the Finternet vision set out
by Agustín Carstens and Nandan Nilekani, and stablecoins. It crosses two
uncertainties: whether money stays in regulated bank form or fragments into
stablecoins and other tokens, and whether customers keep deciding inside bank
channels or delegate to AI agents and open-network apps. That gives the four
scenarios in Figure 1.

Figure
1. Scenario frame for 2035, from Part 1: money layer by customer interface.
On current policy, Part 1 judges India
most likely to move toward Scenario B, in which public rails and AI agents own
the customer interface and banks supply regulated balance sheets. That makes
the foundations in this part more pressing in India than elsewhere. An open,
agent-driven system is only as strong as its weakest connected institution,
only as trusted as its least visible standard, and only as intelligent as the
data it can safely use.
2. Defence as a precondition
for growth
The threat has already reached the
weakest links. In
October 2026, The Economic Times reported that AI-assisted cyberattacks had
taken nearly Rs 300 crore from smaller NBFCs over about two months, with around
150 complaints and FIRs filed in Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai and other cities.
Attackers reportedly spent 10 to 12 days studying each target, broke in through
internet-facing applications and exposed APIs, took over credentials for
payment gateways and partner banks, and moved funds to mule accounts through
IMPS and NEFT. In one Hyderabad case, an NBFC lost more than Rs 3.3 crore
through 183 unauthorised transfers in 87 minutes; police were able to block
only about Rs 40 lakh.
AI raises the speed of attack; quantum
threatens the foundations. The RBI’s June 2026 Financial Stability Report found AI-enabled
cyberattacks to be the leading perceived risk among Indian financial
institutions for the year ahead, with most rating their own preparedness as
developing or intermediate rather than mature. Quantum computing adds a slower
but deeper threat. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer would break the
public-key encryption that protects payments, authentication and stored data.
Because adversaries can copy encrypted data today and decrypt it later, the
risk begins before such a machine exists. The G7 Cyber Expert Group’s January
2026 roadmap sets 2035 as the overall target for moving the financial sector to
quantum-resistant cryptography, with the most critical systems prioritised for
around 2030 to 2032.
India has started, mostly at the top. The National Quantum Mission’s task
force published a quantum-safe roadmap in February 2026 that lists financial
services among priority sectors. In May 2026 the RBI set up an expert committee
on a Quantum Secure and Adaptive Financial Ecosystem, chaired by Professor Anil
Prabhakar of IIT Madras with members from SBI, NPCI, DST, MeitY and DSCI, to
review the sector’s cryptographic inventory and propose a roadmap. The finance
ministry has reportedly asked banks to develop a sector-wide strategy, with an
SBI-led working group examining the transition. On fraud, the India Digital
Payment Intelligence Corporation, set up in consultation with the RBI to share
real-time fraud intelligence, was running in pilot with eight banks in
September 2026.
The gap is in the long tail. India has 8,502 registered NBFCs and
about 1,457 urban co-operative banks, alongside small finance banks, payments
banks and the fintech partners connected to all of them. The RBI’s July 2026
directions on cybersecurity and technology risk now cover all of these entity
types, scaled by size and layer, but rules do not create capability. In the
RBI’s survey, 93% of institutions relied partly or heavily on third parties for
security functions such as monitoring, cloud security and threat intelligence,
and 81% spent less than 5% of revenue on IT in 2025-26. That creates two linked
risks: weak entry points for attackers, and concentration in a few vendors
whose failure would hit many institutions at once. In a system joined by open
APIs, UPI and Account Aggregator flows, a breach at a small lender can quickly
become a problem for its partner bank and for the rails it uses. As RBI Deputy
Governor Shirish Chandra Murmu said in September 2026, quantum resilience is
“an ecosystem capability, not an institutional one”.
What follows. Security can no longer be treated as
a cost centre that slows growth. In an open, agent-driven system, an
institution that cannot show it is secure will increasingly be unable to
connect, and will not be chosen. Large banks can largely fund their own defence.
For the long tail, the realistic answer is shared capability rather than
thousands of separate efforts: sector-level security operations and threat
intelligence, a common standard for cryptographic inventories, certified
quantum-safe components from vendors, and a minimum security floor for any
entity that connects to public rails. Section 7 sets these out.
3. Trust as a standard, not
a slogan
Convenience has outrun trust. India’s digital finance was built to
remove friction, and it has succeeded. Trust has largely been treated as a
given, something the regulator guarantees in the background. Customers notice
the gap. In an EY survey of 2,030 Indian banking customers published in May
2026, 82% said they trust their bank with their data, but only 73% believed
fraud is resolved effectively.
Markets rarely pay for trust they
cannot see. A trust
premium is plausible, but it will not appear on its own. Customers cannot judge
the security of an app or the conduct of a lender until something goes wrong,
so trust tends to be underpriced until a failure and then overpriced in a
panic. A premium becomes real only when trust is made visible and verifiable
through common standards. India already has early building blocks. The RBI
required banks to move to the exclusive bank.in internet domain, registered
through IDRBT, by October 2025, with fin.in planned for other financial
entities, so that customers can tell a genuine site from a fake. Regulated
lenders must report their digital lending apps to the RBI so that borrowers can
check whether an app is linked to a regulated entity. The Account Aggregator
framework built consent into the architecture rather than the fine print. The
DPDP Rules, notified in November 2025, make obligations on consent, security
safeguards and breach notification enforceable from May 2027, with penalties of
up to Rs 250 crore.
AI agents change the economics of
trust. A person
rarely reads a security certificate; an AI agent can check every one, every
time. If trust signals are standardised and machine-readable, agents acting for
customers can route business to institutions that meet them. That is how a
trust premium could be earned in practice: through lower acquisition costs,
stickier deposits and cheaper funding. The global payment networks are moving
in this direction. In September 2026, Visa, Mastercard and Ant International
announced work on an interoperable Know Your Agent framework so that AI agents
can be identified and verified across networks. The logic runs both ways:
institutions must also be able to verify the agents that act on customers’
behalf.
What a financial trust standard could
include. Verified
identity for domains, apps and agents; clear disclosure of consent and data
use; security certification against a published baseline; published service and
fraud-resolution metrics; and defined liability when something fails, following
the “liability follows control” principle NPCI is weighing for agent payments.
Certification would need to be independent, tiered by size and re-tested
regularly, so that it signals current practice rather than a one-time audit.
4. India’s data advantage:
an institution for financial AI
India is far behind in frontier
models. The gap is
one of orders of magnitude, not a few years. The IndiaAI Mission has a budget
of Rs 10,372 crore over five years, roughly $1.2 billion in total. Amazon,
Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta together plan about $725 billion of capital
spending in 2026 alone, most of it on AI: roughly 3,000 times India’s annual
public outlay. Private capital does not close the gap; the 2026 Stanford AI
Index puts US private AI investment at $285.9 billion in 2025, against $12.4
billion for second-placed China. Talent tells a similar story. India has the
world’s second-largest pool of AI researchers, about 50,000, yet recorded the
largest net outflow of AI talent of any country in the same report. An earlier
MacroPolo study found that 12% of elite AI researchers took their first degree
in India, but almost none of them worked there.
The sovereign models are a hedge, not
a frontier challenge.
The IndiaAI Mission has selected 12 organisations, including Sarvam AI and
BharatGen, to build models trained on Indian data and languages, supported by
more than 38,000 GPUs offered at subsidised rates. Early results show the
distance still to travel: Sarvam’s 2025 model, Sarvam-M, had 24 billion
parameters, was built on an open model from France’s Mistral, and drew 23
downloads in its first two days. Later models have improved, but they are
optimised for Indian languages and cost rather than for competing with the
leading general-purpose systems. They are valuable as insurance and as a base
for local adaptation; they should not be mistaken for parity.
The realistic advantage lies in
applications and diffusion. Value from AI increasingly comes from applying models to specific,
high-quality data, and India’s public rails generate such data at a scale few
countries match: more than 25 billion UPI transactions a month, consented
financial data through the Account Aggregator network, GST filings, credit
bureau records and ONDC commerce flows. For finance, smaller specialised models
trained on this data, for credit, fraud and risk, are where India can compete,
because the advantage lies in the data rather than in compute.
But an applications strategy depends
on someone else’s models. Indian institutions will run largely on closed models from US firms or
on open-weight models from the US and China. That creates three risks. Pricing
and access are set abroad and could change with licence terms or export
controls. Sensitive financial data may have to leave Indian control to be
processed. And models tuned to other populations may perform worse on Indian
borrowers, which in credit is a question of fairness and accuracy, not only of
language. The realistic sovereign goal for finance is therefore control over
data, evaluation and deployment, rather than ownership of frontier models.
The data exists but is fragmented. It sits with banks, NBFCs, bureaus,
payment apps, tax authorities and networks, under different rules and formats.
AIKosh, the national AI data platform, held 7,541 datasets across 20 sectors in
February 2026, but its public documentation names no finance datasets. The
RBI’s FREE-AI committee recommended shared infrastructure to democratise access
to data and compute, and the development of indigenous financial-sector AI
models. In October 2026 MeitY published a handbook on the Data Empowerment and
Protection Architecture (DEPA) for AI training. It proposes that models travel
to the data in secure environments rather than data being pooled, and gives
credit models trained on de-identified GST and utility payment data as an
example.
The case for an institution. India built UPI through NPCI, a
not-for-profit owned by banks, and built Account Aggregator through licensed
operators with Sahamati as their self-regulatory body. A comparable institution
for financial AI could do three things no single firm can. It could set common
standards for how financial data is described, labelled and de-identified. It
could run secure environments in which approved models are trained and tested
on data that never leaves its custodians. And it could certify the resulting
models for fairness and performance before they are used in lending, fraud or
risk decisions. The prize is not a single Indian chatbot. It is credit, fraud
and risk models trained on Indian behaviour that work for thin-file borrowers
and small businesses, and that institutions of every size can use, including
those that could never build such models alone. That is how India could lead in
the diffusion of AI across finance.
The design risks are real. The DEPA handbook itself acknowledges
that removing names does not prevent re-identification, and its proposal to go
beyond individual consent for training sits uneasily with India’s consent-led
data protection law. A central pool of financial data would also be one of the
most valuable targets in the country, which links this issue directly to
Section 2. The institution should therefore be federated rather than
centralised, consent-respecting by default, governed with representation for
citizens as well as industry, and held to the highest security tier from the
start.
5. Sector stacks: data
foundations for use cases
India is building data rails sector by
sector. After
identity, payments and financial data, India is now building comparable
infrastructure in other sectors. Agri Stack had created more than 10.31 crore
farmer IDs by August 2026, linked to land records, and its Digital Crop Survey
covered more than 31.3 crore plots in Rabi 2025-26; states keep ownership of
their data under a federated design. The Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission had
issued more than 93 crore health accounts, with over 104 crore health records
linked, by July 2026, and its National Health Claims Exchange aims to
standardise insurance claims the way UPI standardised payments. The India
Energy Stack, led by REC under the Ministry of Power, reviewed its final report
in October 2026 after pilots in six utilities across five states, including
peer-to-peer energy trading and energy credentials held in DigiLocker. In
lending, the Unified Lending Interface already connects 64 lenders to more than
136 data services.
Language is the layer that makes these
usable by everyone.
AI4Bharat at IIT Madras, set up as the Nilekani Centre at AI4Bharat in 2022
with Rs 36 crore from Nandan and Rohini Nilekani, and supported with a total of
Rs 70 crore from Nandan Nilekani by 2025, builds open-source speech,
translation and text models for India’s 22 scheduled languages. Its datasets
include 15,000 hours of transcribed speech from more than 400 districts, and
its models are used in Bhashini, the national language platform. For a farmer
applying for credit or a patient filing a claim, a voice interface in their own
language may matter more than any frontier model.
Each stack opens a financial use case. Farmer IDs linked to land records and
crop data can support faster, cheaper crop loans and insurance for borrowers
that banks have struggled to underwrite. Health records and a common claims
exchange can make health insurance cheaper to process and easier to price.
Energy credentials and peer-to-peer trading can support lending for rooftop
solar and other small renewable assets. Combined with ULI and the Account
Aggregator network, these stacks could let a lender assess a farmer, a clinic
or a small solar installer from verified data, with consent, rather than from
collateral alone.
Registries are not yet training data. Most of these stacks are identity,
registry and exchange layers. Their value for AI depends on data quality, how
often records are updated, whether consent covers model training, and whether
states and departments will share across silos. Linked health records still
average little more than one per account, which shows reach rather than depth,
and a farmer ID tied to out-of-date land records can mislead a credit model.
The institution proposed in Section 4 would need to work across these stacks,
not only within finance, with the same federated and consent-respecting design.
6. From India’s engineers to
the Global South
India’s advantage is building at
population scale and low cost. India has about 1,900 global capability centres employing roughly 2.5
million professionals, the world’s second-largest pool of AI researchers, and
the highest AI skill penetration on LinkedIn’s index according to the 2026
Stanford AI Index. It also has a decade of experience building population-scale
systems that work on basic phones, in many languages and at near-zero cost per
transaction. That combination suits the use cases that matter most to ordinary
citizens: credit for first-time borrowers, crop and health insurance, benefit
delivery and grievance redress.
But the talent is not yet where the
use cases are. The
same capability-centre study found a 43% shortfall in AI, data and analytics
roles. One industry estimate puts India’s 2026 need at about 1.4 million AI
professionals against a pool of about 400,000. Much of India’s engineering
capacity serves global enterprises rather than Indian citizens, and India loses
more AI talent than any other country. Turning engineers into builders of
public-interest use cases needs open data foundations, public procurement that
pays for outcomes, and institutions such as AI4Bharat that keep talent working
on Indian problems.
The Global South is the natural
market. India’s
digital public infrastructure is already travelling: in July 2026 the Ministry
of External Affairs said 25 countries were piloting components of India’s
stack. At the India AI Impact Summit in February 2026, the first in the series
held in the Global South, 92 countries and organisations endorsed the New Delhi
Declaration, and a Global AI Impact Commons was launched with more than 80
deployment stories from over 30 countries. Countries that share India’s
conditions, with many languages, large informal economies and thin credit
histories, need affordable, open applications they can adapt and govern
themselves.
What India can offer, and what it
cannot. India cannot
offer the Global South frontier models. It can offer open protocols, reference
applications, methods for building language data, and governance models that
keep data under national control. For finance, that means open lending and
payment rails, credit models that work for thin-file borrowers, and the trust
and security standards proposed in Section 7. India’s Indic language models
will not transfer directly to other countries, but the open, public-good
approach behind them can. The offer competes with Chinese infrastructure
packages and with global technology platforms, and it will succeed only if it
is cheaper to adopt, easier to govern and proven at home first.
7. An agenda for regulators
and the ecosystem
Several of the moves in Part 1’s board
agenda cannot be made by individual institutions. They need public or
collective action, and most can build on institutions India already has. Table
1 sets out seven proposals for discussion.
|
Proposal |
What it would do |
Who could lead |
|
Shared cyber defence for
smaller lenders |
Security monitoring,
threat intelligence and incident response offered as a service to NBFCs,
co-operative banks and small finance banks, priced by size |
RBI with industry bodies,
building on CSIRT-Fin and IDPIC |
|
A quantum-readiness
standard for finance |
A common cryptographic
inventory format, certified quantum-safe components and staged deadlines in
line with the G7 2030 to 2035 horizon |
RBI quantum committee with
DST and CERT-In |
|
A security floor for
connecting to public rails |
Any entity connecting to
UPI, Account Aggregator, ULI or ONDC meets a published, tested baseline and
is re-certified regularly |
Network operators and
their self-regulatory bodies, with the RBI |
|
A financial trust standard |
Machine-readable trust
signals for institutions, apps and agents; published fraud-resolution
metrics; agent identity aligned with global Know Your Agent work |
RBI with self-regulatory
organisations; IDRBT for identity |
|
Liability rules for
agent-initiated transactions |
Settle who bears the loss
when an AI agent acts wrongly, before agent payments scale |
RBI and NPCI |
|
An institution for
financial AI data |
Federated, DEPA-based
secure training environments, common data standards and model certification
for finance |
RBI and Reserve Bank
Innovation Hub with MeitY’s IndiaAI Mission; industry-owned on the NPCI model |
|
Open use cases for the
common citizen and the Global South |
Open reference
applications for credit, insurance and benefits built on Agri Stack, ABDM,
the India Energy Stack and ULI, packaged for adoption by partner countries;
funding for public-interest AI talent |
MeitY’s IndiaAI Mission
and the Ministry of External Affairs, with AI4Bharat, network operators and
industry |
Table
1. Proposals for regulators, network operators and industry bodies.
India’s experience with UPI and
Account Aggregator suggests a pattern: public standards and shared
infrastructure, with private institutions competing on top. The same pattern
can work for defence, trust and data. The risk of not acting collectively is that
the gains of AI and the Finternet accrue to the largest banks and platforms,
while the losses fall on the long tail of smaller institutions and their
customers.
8. Signposts to watch
Table 2 lists signals that would show
whether these foundations are being built, or whether the risks are growing
faster. Part 1 sets out the market signposts for the scenarios themselves.
|
Signpost |
Points toward |
Status, November 2026 |
|
RBI’s quantum committee
publishes a roadmap with deadlines |
Cross-cutting: defence |
Committee set up May 2026;
report due six months after its first meeting |
|
Further AI-enabled attacks
on lenders connected to public rails |
Cross-cutting: defence and
trust |
Nearly Rs 300 crore
reported lost by smaller NBFCs in about two months, October 2026 |
|
DPDP obligations on
consent, security and breach notice become enforceable |
Cross-cutting: trust |
Main obligations from May
2027 |
|
A secure environment for
training financial AI on Indian data goes live |
Cross-cutting: data;
supports B |
DEPA for AI training
handbook published October 2026 |
|
Agri Stack or ABDM data
opened, with consent, for credit and insurance underwriting |
Cross-cutting: data;
supports B |
10.31 crore farmer IDs
(August 2026); 93 crore health accounts (July 2026) |
Table
2. Signposts for defence, trust and data.
9. Questions for discussion
These questions do not have settled
answers. They are offered to regulators, policymakers, network operators,
industry bodies and civil society to argue over.
• Should a lender that cannot meet a
minimum security standard be allowed to connect to UPI or the Account
Aggregator network at all, knowing that excluding it may also cut off credit to
its borrowers?
• Who should pay for shared cyber
defence for more than 8,500 NBFCs and 1,400 urban co-operative banks: the
institutions, the networks they use, or the state?
• Can individual consent survive AI
training at population scale, or does India need a new form of collective
consent? Who speaks for the citizen whose data trains the model?
• Should India keep funding sovereign
foundation models, or redirect more of that money to data, evaluation and
applications?
• Is a national institution for
financial AI data a public good or a honeypot? What governance would make you
trust it with your own data?
• What would make a Global South country
choose India’s open approach over a Chinese infrastructure package or a global
technology platform?
• If trust becomes machine-readable,
will institutions compete on being trustworthy, or on gaming the signals?
10. Limitations and next
steps
• Several figures come from secondary
reporting of primary documents (RBI, Sahamati, NPCI, BIS, BCG-FICCI-IBA).
• Section 2 relies partly on news
reporting of recent cyber incidents and policy announcements, some of which are
not yet confirmed in official documents.
• The proposals in Section 7 are
outlines; each would need its own design, governance and cost assessment.
• Sections 5 and 6 go beyond banking.
They are included because sector data and engineering talent will shape
financial use cases, but they are not examined in depth, and some talent
estimates come from commercial reports.
• Other emerging-market DPI systems,
including Indonesia, are treated briefly. The scenario analysis and its
supporting evidence are in Part 1.
About the author
T Koshy is the founding Managing
Director and CEO of India’s Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), and
serves on the Board of Commissioners of the Indonesia Open Network (ION), a
Beckn protocol-based digital public infrastructure initiative modelled on ONDC.
He is a Director on the boards of CRIF
High Mark, Aditya Birla Housing Finance, Perfios Account Aggregation Services
and Last Mile Care.
His career spans NSDL, EY, Projects
with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as several national
digital transformation programmes in India. He is a distinguished alumnus of
IIM Bangalore.
"The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable." Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Chapter VIII
Disclosure: the author’s roles at a credit information company, an Account Aggregator, a housing finance company and an open commerce network relate directly to several proposals in this part, including the security floor for public rails, the trust standard and the financial AI data institution. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of any organisation with which he is associated.
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18. NewKerala,
Customers trust banks with data, but only fully satisfied with fraud
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19. Business
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20. MediaNama,
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21. Mondaq,
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22. Compliance
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23. PYMNTS,
Visa and Mastercard team with Ant on Know Your Agent framework, September 2026.
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24. Press
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25. YourStory,
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26. ThePrint,
Govt handbook for sharing hospital and bank data to train AI models, November
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27. Tom’s
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28. ThePrint,
India leads in AI talent but also brain-drain anxiety, says Stanford’s AI Index
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29. ThePrint,
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30. Outlook
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31. IIT
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32. Entrepreneur
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33. BioVoice
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34. News
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35. Telangana
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36. T&D
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37. Storyboard18,
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39. Open
Source For You, MeitY and MEA drive global rollout as 25 nations pilot India’s
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40. Press
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